














































Recently  there  has  been  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  use  of  markets  for  the  purpose  of 
aggregating information and forming forecasts (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004 for a general discussion). 
Chen and Plott (2002) set up internal prediction markets at Hewlett‐Packard to forecast sales.  They 
























considered  agents  with  relatively  weak  manipulation  incentives.  In  this  study,  we  use  laboratory 













markets  were  unsuccessful.”  Failed  attempts  at  manipulating  markets  include  political  candidates 












result  confirmed  in  the  Replication  Treatment  of  Hanson,  et  al.  (2006).  Hanson,  et  al.  (2006)  also 
conducted  series  of  Manipulation  Treatment  experiments  where  some  traders  received  additional 
payment based upon the median transaction price and thus had an incentive to push prices upwards. 








observers  who  make  predictions  about  the  realized  value.















(relative  to  random  guessing)  with  functioning  prediction  markets.  The  manipulators  attempt  to 
manipulate prices, but have no effect on information aggregation and do not reduce the accuracy of 
observer forecasts.      
Taken  together,  the  evidence  suggests  prediction  markets  are  quite  robust  to  attempted 
































only  based  upon  the  amount  invested  incorrectly  by  the  forecasters.  This  gives  our  manipulators 
maximal  incentive  to  disrupt  the  market’s  ability  to  aggregate  information.  In  this  sense,  our 


























































































1  Black  3  20.0  11  M3 
2  Black  6  94.1  12  None 
3  White  2  5.9  13  M1 
4  Black  6  94.1  14  M2 
5  White  1  1.5  15  M4 
6  White  1  1.5  16  None 
7  Black  4  50.0  17  M2 
8  White  3  20.0  18  M3 
9  Black  7  98.5  19  M1 
10  Black  5  80.0  20  M4 
11  White  1  1.5  1  M3 
12  White  5  80.0  2  M4 
13  White  2  5.9  3  None 
14  Black  5  80.0  4  M2 
15  Black  6  94.1  5  M1 
16  White  2  5.9  6  M2 
17  White  2  5.9  7  M3 
18  White  3  20  8  M4 
19  White  3  20  9  None 



















equal  to  his  personal  beliefs  in  order  to  maximize  his  expected  payoff.











100  72.7  0  [0.97,1.00] 
95  72.5  5  [0.91,0.96] 
90  72  10  [0.84,0.90] 
85  71  15  [0.77,0.83] 
80  69.5  20  [0.72,0.76] 
75  67.5  25  [0.67,0.71] 
70  65  30  [0.63,0.66] 
65  62  35  [0.59,0.62] 
60  58.5  40  [0.56,0.58] 
55  54.5  45  [0.53,0.55] 
50  50  50  [0.48,0.52] 
45  45  54.5  [0.45,0.47] 
40  40  58.5  [0.42,0.45] 
35  35  62  [0.38,0.41] 
30  30  65  [0.34,0.37] 
25  25  67.5  [0.29,0.33] 
20  20  69.5  [0.24,0.28] 
15  15  71  [0.17,0.23] 
10  10  72  [0.10,0.16] 
5  5  72.5  [0.04,0.09] 














































making  investments,  manipulators  would  like  to  mislead  decision‐makers  to  making  incorrect 
investments  by  manipulating  market  prices.  Manipulators  were  endowed  with  1200ECU  and  could 
participate in the market like regular Traders.  The Manipulator’s endowment is 4 times that of a regular 
trader  resulting  in  the  Manipulator  having  one  third  of  the  money  in  the  market.  However, 
Manipulators were not paid in any way for their market earnings.  Instead, they were paid solely based 
upon the average amount that Forecasters invested in the wrong event.  Even though Forecasters could 






































Baseline  and  Liquidity  treatments,  the  10  Forecasters  were  Inexperienced.  For  the  Manipulation 
treatment, there were 30 Forecasters:  10 drawn from the experienced Forecasters returning for the 
second  day,  10  from  the  experienced  traders  retuning  for  the  second  day,  and  10  from  the 
























Treatment  Baseline  Liquidity  Manipulation 





Number of Traders  8  8  8 


























average forecaster investment (small  triangles),  the true value of the assets (thick  dashes) and  the 



















































Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16  17  18 19 20
Average 
Price 
46  63  49  79  56  53  61  70  83  72  44  73  71  66  73  58  68  65  65  74 
Closing 
Price 




16  8  19  6  20  14  29  4  10  6  16  9  2  17  9  11  6  7  9  10 
Trade 
Volume 
13  15  12  10  12  20  7  11  12  15  17  16  10  9  12  16  7  8  14  16 
 
Liquidity Treatment  
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16  17  18 19 20
Average 
Price 
87  87  71  80  57  50  48  66  64  75  59  72  70  76  84  51  47  65  54  70 
Closing 
Price 




12  8  15  7  14  20  18  10  17  11  18  15  14  9  7  9  14  17  15  12 
Trade 
Volume 



























































The  results  in  Table  5  reflect  the  direction  of  the  change  in  Forecasters’  estimates,  but 
Forecaster behavior could also be influenced by risk attitude, optimism, or the price dispersion in the 
market.  In all three cases, these variables could influence how aggressively, measured as an absolute 























Constant  0.034  0.817  0.04  0.967 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.553  0.043  12.77  <0.001 
Number of Excess Bids  0.516  .108  4.79  <0.001 
Liquidity – 10 Forecasters (Observations = 1408)    
Constant ‐ 0.054  0.864 ‐ 0.06  0.950 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.393  0.061  6.47  <0.001 
Number of Excess Bids  0.876  0.162  5.38  <0.001 
Top Five Earners – Baseline and Liquidity Combined (Observations =1125 ) 
Constant ‐ 0.032  0.6870 ‐ 0.05  0.963 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.567  0.038  14.77  <0.001 
Number of Excess Bids  1.012  0.099  10.26  <0.001 
Bottom Five Earners ‐ Baseline and Liquidity Combined (Observations = 1120) 
Constant  0.390  0.992  0.39  0.694 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.419  0.057  7.30  <0.001 





















Constant  12.56  2.98  4.22  0.000 
Standard Deviation of Prices ‐ 0.09  0.05 ‐ 1.81  0.071 
| Average of Five Most Recent 
Transaction Prices – 50| 
0.26  0.03  10.27  0.000 
|Excess Bids|  0.67  0.08  8.85  0.000 
Risk Index  1.52  4.80  0.32  0.751 


















Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16  17  18 19 20
Average 
Price 
52  48  56  63  50  60  57  46  63  58  61  56  57  51  57  61  54  62  66  72 
Closing 
Price 




10  17  7  12  13  9  6  13  4  8  5  6  5  2  4  3  8  10  10  13 
Trade 
Volume 




























































































































Constant  0.085  0.811  0.10  0.917 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.131  0.066  1.97  0.049 
Number of Excess Bids ‐ 0.866  0.135 ‐ 0.64  0.520 
Trader Experience (Observations = 1598)    
Constant  0.134  0.617  0.22  0.828 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.377  0.052  7.30  <0.001 
Number of Excess Bids ‐ 0.548  0.102 ‐ 5.38  <0.001 
Forecaster Experience (Observations = 1595) 
Constant ‐ 0.202  0.501 ‐ 0.40  0.687 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
‐0.098  0.041 ‐ 2.40  0.017 
Number of Excess Bids  0.054  0.082  0.66  0.511 
Top Five Earners among all 30 forecasters (Observations = 792) 
Constant  0.360  0.961  0.37  0.708 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.111  0.080  1.39  0.165 
Number of Excess Bids  0.647  0.161  4.01  <0.001 
Bottom Five Earners among all 30 forecasters (Observations = 800) 
Constant ‐ 0.287  1.347 ‐ 0.21  0.831 
Moving Average of 5 Most 
Recent Transaction Prices 
0.443  0.110  4.02  <0.001 








Constant  8.55  3.46  2.47  0.013 
Standard Deviation of Prices  0.20  0.04  4.66  0.000 
| Average of Five Most Recent 
Transaction Prices – 50| 
0.11  0.02  5.05  0.000 
|Excess Bids|  0.34  0.06  5.35  0.000 
Risk Index  0.65  8.03  0.08  0.935 








evidence  that  these  people  are  making  bad  decisions.  One  explanation  for  the  poor  market 
performance  could  be  that  Manipulators  in  their  attempts  to  mislead  the  Forecasters  are  actually 








Given  that  manipulators  are  successfully  preventing  the  market  from  providing  useful 




offers  that  others  accepted.  This  variation  by  Manipulators  helps  explain  why  it  is  so  difficult  for 
Forecasters to consistently predict the event.  However, while Manipulators are involved in 57.4% of the 




period  there  are  relatively  few  trades,  but  prices  are  on  the  correct  side  of  50.  Each  of  the  four 




































Stand Deviation of Prices  11.50  9.14  0.128   
|Average Price – 50|  15.66  7.85  0.008
** 
|Excess Bids|  3.31  3.49  0.467 




































Excess Bids ‐ 1.92 1.84  0.020
** ‐4.00 ‐1.88  0.043
**
Average Price  60.51 70.72  0.003
*** 54.99 59.23  0.208
Stand Deviation of Prices  11.57 11.40  0.696 9.39 8.88  1.000
|Average Price – 50|  11.33 21.36  0.002
*** 6.48 9.23  0.462
|Excess Bids|  3.16 3.51  0.610 3.71 3.27  0.713


















prediction  markets  can  be  manipulated.  Further,  our  results  show  that  the  effects  of  introducing 













specific  environmental  and  intuitional  factors  affect  the  ability  of  prediction  markets  to  aggregate 
information in the presence of attempted manipulation and the strategies employed by manipulators.  
For example, would a more sophisticated manipulator be able to exploit a belief that manipulators do 




















































































































































If a Trader does not have a share, but still wishes to sell, she can create a 
share.  Creating a share is identical to selling an existing share except 
that the seller will have to pay the buyer 100 if the event is Black and 0 
if the event is White.  In order to make sure the seller creating a share 
can cover the value at the end of the round, the computer automatically 
takes 100 from the Trader and puts it into a reserve account to cover 
payment if the event is Black.  So to create a share a Trader must have 
100 in cash after adding the selling price, which the seller receives.  The 
reserves are given back to the trader if the event is white. 
 29 
 
Financial Report –E n d  of Most Recent Period :
Actual Share Dividend x
Dividends earned






















If the event is Black shares are worth 100.  If the 


































To accept an existing offer from another participant, a Trader can click the Buy or Sell button in the Immediate Order section above. The 
Immediate Order section shows the best prices to buy, or sell, that are currently available on the market. 
By clicking on the Sell button, a Trader sells at the listed price. 
The current best offer to buy is 45, if a Trader clicks Sell, she sells a share at the price of 45 immediately.
Her shares go to -1 (she is short a share).
Her cash holdings will initially increase by 45, but her cash will then decrease by 100 as money is put in reserves 
to cover the share if the event is Black (pays 100).  The net change in her cash is +45(price) -100 (in reserves) = -55.   
If the event turns out to be White, the 100 in reserves will be given back to her. 
By clicking on the Buy button, a Trader buys at the listed price. 















The Information section will provide Traders updates on the following:
• Her signal (it is light gray in this example);
• Common information (this tells her how the shares payoff);
The share earnings each round will be added to the cash account of the holder. 
A Traders earnings will accumulate each period. 




If the event is Black shares are worth 100.  If the 















Each round, Forecasters decide how much of their budget to invest in Black.  Any 
money not invested in Black is automatically invested in White by the computer.  So 
the amount invested in Black + amount invested in White  = 100.  Forecaster 
investments must be in increments of 5. 
A Forecaster’s payoff will be determined by the amount invested in the actual event, 
according to the accompanying table.  This table is also provided to you at your 





100 0 72.7 0
95 5 72.5 5
90 10 72 10
85 15 71 15
80 20 69.5 20
75 25 67.5 25
70 30 65 30
65 35 62 35
60 40 58.5 40
55 45 54.5 45
50 50 50 50
45 55 45 54.5
40 60 40 58.5
35 65 35 62
30 70 30 65
25 75 25 67.5
20 80 20 69.5
15 85 15 71
10 90 10 72
5 95 5 72.5
0 100 0 72.7  33 
 
For example, if a Forecaster invests 75 in Black and the event is Black, he will earn 
67.5.  However, if the event is White he would earn 25 (as he had invested 100-75 = 
25 in White).    
Thus, the more confident a Forecaster is that the event will be Black, the more he 
should invest in Black.  Similarly, the more confident he is that the event will be 





100 0 72.7 0
95 5 72.5 5
90 10 72 10
85 15 71 15
80 20 69.5 20
75 25 67.5 25
70 30 65 30
65 35 62 35
60 40 58.5 40
55 45 54.5 45
50 50 50 50
45 55 45 54.5
40 60 40 58.5
35 65 35 62
30 70 30 65
25 75 25 67.5
20 80 20 69.5
15 85 15 71
10 90 10 72
5 95 5 72.5
0 100 0 72.7  
Now we will describe a Forecaster’s screen.
At the start of each round the investment in Black will be 50 since Black and White are equally 
likely. 
A Forecaster can change his investment as many times as he wants during a round, but only the 
last investment in a round will be used to determine his payoff.  The amount of time available 
for investing is determined randomly.  A Forecaster will not know how much time he has and it 
may be less than the time remaining in the market.  Thus, Forecasters should keep their 
investment updated.  34 
 
If during the round a Forecaster wants to change his investment, he can just move the Slider to 
the desired investment level and press Submit.  
For example, if the Forecaster wanted to invest 65, he can just move the slider to 65 and then 
press submit. 
His investment level would be 65 unless he changes it before his time runs out and his slider is 
disabled for the round.  
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